Hi Gerry:
Thanks for the example. So if there are no restricted data, then there
wouldn't be a problem, is that correct? This is why I posted - I want to
gain an understanding of the issues, and am hoping that others have a
better hold on them than I do.
What would help me understand this better also is if someone
knowledgeable can review what my options are for implementing Rob's
request. I would prefer not to alter THREDDS directly, so that i can
easily undo the change if I needed to.
Thanks,
-Roy
PS - Just to give some more background, we have a server called ERDDAP,
and for some agencies to deploy it has required that it undergo a scan.
That is not necessarily my preference, but that is the reality, So i
would rather anticipate and deal with these issues up front, rather than
after the scan finds shortcomings.
On Apr 25, 2013, at 8:00 AM, Gerry Creager - NOAA Affiliate <
gerry.creager@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
Jon -- A big concern from our point of view (note: some mental
gemnastics may be involved in following this) is that a site accessed
from
another "trusted" site via cross-origin credentials, may serve sensitive
data to an unprivileged user. That constitutes a data breach and as such,
tends to cause alarms to go off around here. Speaking as someone who just
endured over 2 months of bureaucratic wrangling to gain access to a
"restricted" dataset, if the work to get those data got worse because
someone had made this same set publicly accessible, even inadvertently,
it
would start approaching "useless" within my organization.
Benno -- tell me you don't expect Microsoft to conform to a standard
they don't either own, or have claimed to own?
gerry
On Thu, Apr 25, 2013 at 9:46 AM, Jon Blower <j.d.blower@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
Hi all,
An honest (and perhaps innocent) question - if a server is already
public and read-only, what is there to lose by enabling CORS? The
cross-origin security constraints exist for the security of the client
(browser), not the server. You could after all be accessing the server
through something that isn't a browser at all.
However, if a server requires logins, and/or allows changes to the
server to be made through the web interface, then CORS is perhaps more of
an issue (most of the examples in the website Dennis quotes are around
these use cases).
>From that same website, the risk of allowing CORS for a public
read-only site appears to be that an attacker could use users' web
browsers
to perform a distributed denial-of-service attack, which is surely
already
possible anyway (and is why many sysadmins implement throttling or some
other strategy).
Cheers,
Jon
(not a security expert or a sysadmin!)
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**********************
"The contents of this message do not reflect any position of the U.S.
Government or NOAA."
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Roy Mendelssohn
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NOAA/NMFS
Environmental Research Division
Southwest Fisheries Science Center
1352 Lighthouse Avenue
Pacific Grove, CA 93950-2097
e-mail: Roy.Mendelssohn@xxxxxxxx (Note new e-mail address)
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"Old age and treachery will overcome youth and skill."
"From those who have been given much, much will be expected"
"the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice" -MLK
Jr.
