I generally keep my comments off of this list, but the official
statement is not accurate. As you know, Gilbert, WRIP (NOAA Weather
Radio) was only partially up and that was WFO dependent - if an WFO
fired up their CRS, they could manually record hourly forecasts and
observations.
Likewise, checking the tombstones via local forecast on weather.gov
resulted in "N/A" for most zip codes I tried during the outage.
From an IT side, I would say this particular event should help
illustrate the foolhardy paradigm of "putting all your eggs in one
basket." HPC, NCEP, EMC . . . all were hit with this outage. NWWS,
EMWIN, and SBN were all down. A primary and secondary router paradigm
in the same physical location may save lots of money, but is an
incredible liability for data distribution.
I have always advocated that a live secondary should be placed
geographically distant from the primary uplink and NCF . . . and KC has
legacy and national networking infrastructure already in place to make
it a likely candidate. Or Boulder, at ESRL.
Not that my comments will merit any action, but if pointing out what
seems obvious to me gains traction, that would be great. I would even
start filling out my TPS cover sheets for all my memos, and coming in on
over the weekend to work. ("Office Space" reference)
Stonie
On 02/14/2017 03:17 PM, Gilbert Sebenste wrote:
Here it is:
NWS Statement on Cause of Outage on Feb. 13
Feb. 14, 2017
The National Weather Service experienced a failure of its AWIPS Network
Control Facility communications network at 2:08 p.m. EST Feb 13. The
outage, lasting two hours, 36 minutes, prevented us from fully
distributing forecasts and warnings. During the outage, the public was
able to access forecasts, watches and warnings by NOAA Weather Radio and
the social media accounts of their local forecast office.
Technicians quickly determined the cause of the problem was the
simultaneous failure of two core communications routers - primary and
backup - for the control facility due to a power problem. The routers
were replaced and the system was restored to full service. We are still
investigating what caused the power outage.
The AWIPS communications system is a very reliable configuration and
this is the first time both routers failed simultaneously.
We are implementing additional communication pathways to the backup
Network Control Facility to ensure that problems encountered in
switching operations to this backup facility will not recur.
---
*Gilbert Sebenste*
Staff Meteorologist
Environmental Health and Safety
Labs for Wellness 154 | DeKalb, Illinois 60115
815-753-5492
_gilbert@xxxxxxx <mailto:gilbert@xxxxxxx>_
http://weather.admin.niu.edu <http://weather.admin.niu.edu/>
Everyone. Home. Safely.
NIU
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